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Ad Valorem Taxation-RATIFICATION OF FLORIDA'S AD VALOREM
TAX STRUCTURE: REJECTION OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHAL-
LENGE-Spooner v. Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1976).
In February of 1973, the Gadsden County Tax Assessor received
a letter from the Florida Department of Revenue informing him that
Gadsden County's 1973 tax roll would not be approved unless the
level of assessment was increased.' As a direct consequence of this
prodding by the Department, the assessed valuation of nonexempt
real property in Gadsden County was increased by eighty-five per-
cent over the previous year.2 The county tax assessor 3 submitted the
tax roll to the Department of Revenue, and it was duly certified.4
On October 30, 1973, the Gadsden County Board of Tax Adjustment
reviewed approximately 100 assessments.5 The Board, noting that
property in neighboring counties appeared to be assessed at a signif-
icantly lower rate than in Gadsden County, adopted resolutions
which effectively reduced the total assessed valuation of the county
thirty percent.' The Department of Revenue refused to approve the
reduced valuations because the Board had failed to investigate indi-
vidually each affected piece of property. 7 Property owners then
brought this case, a class action suit to have the modified assess-
ments certified.'
The trial court granted partial relief to the property owners on
1. In addition, the tax assessor was summoned to Tallahassee for a conference with de-
partment officials, who reiterated the warning that they would not approve the tax roll if there
was not an increase in the assessed value of property within the county. Brief for Appellee
Owenby at 3, Spooner v. Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1976).
2. 345 So. 2d at 1057.
3. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § l(d) was amended in the 1974 general election, changing the
name of the office of "tax assessor" to "property appraiser." Similar changes in the Florida
Statutes were recently made by the Florida Legislature. See ch. 77-102, 1977 Fla. Laws 204.
To preserve continuity, the term "tax assessor" will be used throughout this comment.
4. 345 So. 2d at 1057. This procedure is set forth in FLA. STAT. § 193.114 (1977).
5. The name of the County Board of Tax Adjustment was changed in 1976 to Property
Appraisal Adjustment Board to conform to the 1974 constitutional change in the title of the
tax assessor to "property appraiser." See ch. 76-133, 1976 Fla. Laws 231, and note 3 supra.
6. The board compared selected assessments in the nearby counties of Washington,
Holmes, Jackson, Wakulla, Madison, and Taylor. Within the same geographical distance
from Gadsden County, but not considered by the board, were Calhoun, Leon, Liberty, Bay,
Gulf, Franklin, and Jefferson Counties. 345 So. 2d at 1057 n.2.
7. Id. at 1057 & n.3. FLA. STAT. § 194.032 (1977) requires the Board of Tax Adjustment to
investigate each challenge to a tax assessor's valuation. FA. STAT. § 193.114(6) (1977) pro-
vides that the executive director of the Department of Revenue must disapprove any part of
a tax roll not in substantial compliance with the law.
8. The Governor, the Board of Tax Adjustment, and the County Tax Assessor were joined.
See FLA. STAT. § 194.181 (1977).
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equal protection grounds.' It found that the tax rolls of other coun-
ties were certified by the Department even though the property in
those counties was not assessed at the constitutionally mandated
"just valuation."' 0 On direct appeal the Florida Supreme Court re-
versed." In an opinion by Justice England, the court found the
evidence insufficient to substantiate a denial of equal protection
and held that the Gadsden County Board of Tax Adjustment was
without authority to consider the levels of assessment in other coun-
ties.'" Seemingly having resolved the controversy, the court went on
to comment that a taxpayer whose property is properly assessed has
never had standing to complain of lower assessment levels in an-
other taxing unit and, in any event, the statutory requirement of
statewide uniformity is more a goal than a compellable right. 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Boyd pointed out that the law is
quite clear that all real property in the State of Florida must be
assessed at its actual value. Given that the average assessment of
property in the state for 1973 was eighty-two percent of full value,
he argued that the proper action to be taken by the court would be
to retain jurisdiction over the suit and direct the Department of
Revenue to ensure that all other counties were brought up to full
value. 4 A brief dissent by Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Adkins,
asserted that the case presented mixed questions of law and fact
that were correctly decided by the trial court. 5
As long ago as 1885 the Florida Constitution provided that for the
purpose of taxation, real property should be assessed at its just
valuation."' Yet only in relatively recent times has just valuation
been interpreted to mean the full cash value of the property. 7 It was
9. Spooner v. Askew, No. 73-1738 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Leon County, Feb. 18, 1975). Suits
challenging the constitutionality of the assessment of ad valorem taxes may be brought either
in the county where the property is located or in Leon County. FLA. STAT. § 194.181 (1977).
10. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 provides: "By general law regulations shall be prescribed
which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation .... "
11. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) gives the Florida Supreme Court original appellate
jurisdiction if the decision of the trial court directly passes on the constitutional validity of a
state statute.
12. 345 So. 2d at 1058-59. The court found that while the Board of Tax Adjustment had
authority to investigate challenged assessments on an individual basis, the board was without
authority to adjust assessments "across-the-board." Id. at 1058.
13. Id. at 1059.
14. Id. at 1060.
15. Id. at 1060-61.
16. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1885). The current constitution has essentially the same
provision. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Earlier Florida constitutions merely referred to "an
equal and uniform mode of taxation to be general throughout the state." See, e.g., FLA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1838).
17. See Schleman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 9 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1942). Although
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not until the population pressures and concomitant legal challenges
of the early 1960's"s that the courts issued clear statements that all
property within a taxing unit must be assessed at one hundred
percent of actual cash value and provided a standard by which this
value could be determined."
Concurrent with judicial efforts to define just valuation, the legis-
lature provided guidelines to the county tax assessors to enable
them properly to assess the value of the property within their coun-
ties. One of the most significant early acts was to authorize state
tax forms in 1943.20 The standards promulgated under the statute
were eventually codified 2 and were later incorporated into a de-
tailed manual published annually by the Department of Revenue. 22
The manual is distributed to the various county assessors to pro-
mote statewide uniformity in assessment techniques.
But despite these judicial, legislative, and administrative efforts,
counties persisted in assessing real property at a fraction of true
value. 3 As late as 1969 at least some assessors paid little or no
attention to the manual. 4 The Department of Revenue, without the
necessary administrative structure to implement its general super-
visory powers over property assessment, could do little to remedy
this situation.
The 1973 legislature took the matter firmly in hand and substan-
case law was slow to equate "just value" with "full cash value," Florida had a statute
antedating the 1885 Constitution stating precisely that rule. See ch. 3219, § 18, 1881 Fla. Laws
21. This statute was repealed in 1963 when the legislature set forth specific criteria to be used
by tax assessors in determining just valuation. See ch. 63-250, 1963 Fla. Laws 600. The first
criterion is "[tihe present cash value of the property." Id. § 1.
18. For an analysis of some of the earlier legislative efforts in the area of ad valorem
taxation, see Wershow, Recent Developments in Ad Valorem Taxation, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 1
(1967), and Wershow, Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida-Whither Now?, 18 U. FLA. L. Rv.
9 (1965).
19. After a lengthy discussion in which "just valuation" was equated with the term "X,"
the Florida Supreme Court in Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965), concluded:
The more we ponder the problem the more difficult the solution appears. But settle
it we must and we have concluded after earnest study that the sensible way to do
so is to adopt the chancellor's idea that "fair market value" and "just valuation"
should be declared "legally synonymous" and that such is the best way to arrive
at the definition of "X". The former term is a familiar one and it, in turn, may be
established by the classic formula that it is the amount a "purchaser willing but
not obliged to buy, would pay to one willing but not obliged to sell."
Id. at 85-86 (citation omitted). See Burns v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1966); McNayr v.
State ex rel. Dupont Plaza Center, Inc., 166 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1964).
20. Ch. 22079, § 46, 1943 Fla. Laws 865.
21. Ch. 63-250, § 1, 1963 Fla. Laws 600.
22. FLA. DEP'T OF REvENUE, STATE MANUAL OF PROCEDURES FOR AD VALORm TAX
AsSEssMENT (1976).
23. See Dickinson v. Geraci, 190 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
24. See Dep't of Revenue v. Bell, 227 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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tially rewrote the provisions governing ad valorem taxation." The
statute provides that the detailed rules and regulations promul-
gated by the Department of Revenue, including the manual, are
mandatory rather than advisory and calls for periodic audits of
county assessments to check compliance with these rules.26 Where
an audit discloses underassessment, the department has authority
to issue an administrative order to the tax assessor to correct the
assessment level and to monitor closely the steps taken to comply
with the order.Y As a last resort, the department on its own author-
ity may withhold state funds from a county which has improperly
assessed property within its boundaries.28 In sum, a detailed admin-
istrative structure over ad valorem taxation was constructed, and
the department was granted the necessary authority to make it
work. 29
In 1973 the legislature also made substantial changes in educa-
tional finance, an area closely allied with ad valorem taxation."0
While it is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss in detail the
Florida Educational Finance Program (FEFP), its workings are cru-
cial to an understanding of Spooner. Under FEFP a "base student
cost" is determined each year by the legislature, to be funded from
general revenues and ad valorem taxes.3 ' At the time this allocation
is made, the legislature has access to the certified county tax rolls
as well as revenue projections for the various state taxes. Based
upon the assessed valuation for the entire state as shown by the
certified ad valorem tax rolls, the Department of Education then
prescribes a minimum millage for local participation in FEFP.
3 2
Each county is expected to raise and spend at the local level an
amount equal to ninety-five percent of the assessed valuation times
25. Ch. 73-172, § 2, 1973 Fla. Laws 331.
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 195.027(1), .096 (1977).
27. Id. § 195.097.
28. Id. § 195.101.
29. The comprehensive nature of this legislation can best be appreciated by a few exam-
ples. It established standards of value, FLA. STAT. 195.032 (1977), standardized the classifica-
tion of property, FLA. STAT. § 195.073 (1977), required information sharing, FLA. STAT. §
195.084 (1977), gave the department control over the computer systems which enable local
assessors to provide information promptly, FLA. STAT. § 195.095 (1977), established a loan
fund to allow local counties to purchase such equipment, FLA. STAT. § 195.094 (1977), and
last, but hardly least, gave the department veto power over the budget of the local tax
assessors, FLA. STAT. § 195.087 (1977).
30. See ch. 73-345, 1973 Fla. Laws 1235. For further discussion of the current state of
educational finance, see generally, Clune, Wealth Discrimination in School Finance, 68 Nw.
U.L. REv. 651 (1973); Coons, Introduction: "Fiscal Neutrality" after Rodriquez, 38 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 299 (1974); Grubb & Michelson, Public School Finance in a Post-Serrano
World, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 550 (1973).
31. FLA. STAT. § 236.081(1)(b) (1977).
32. Id. § 236.081(4).
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the minimum millage rate.3 The purpose of this scheme is to ensure
approximate parity of educational funding for public school pupils
in all parts of the state.34
This carefully developed and thoroughly integrated system of
educational finance and ad valorem taxation combines so that each
county should ideally contribute to educational funding at the same
rate, with the state providing the necessary differential to maintain
statewide equality.3 Yet if a county underassesses its property and
decreases the total assessed value for the state, serious problems
arise. The Department of Education's minimum millage rate will
increase, and taxpapers in properly assessed counties will be doubly
penalized: first by paying the higher ad valorem taxes, and again
when these counties receive less than their fair share of state educa-
tion funds.31 It was relief from this double penalty which was sought
by the Gadsden County taxpayers. 37
On the surface this situation appears to present a compelling
argument to either reduce the Gadsden County assessments or raise
the assessment levels of the other counties. 8 Indeed, each approach
was endorsed by a minority of the Spooner court, the former in the
dissenting opinion of Justices Roberts and Adkins" and the latter
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 236.012(1) (1977) provides:
The intent of the Legislature is:
(1) To guarantee to each student in the Florida public educational system the
availability of programs and services appropriate to his educational needs which
are substantially equal to those available to any similar student notwithstanding
geographic differences and varying local economic factors.
35. Perhaps one impetus for this legislation was the California decision of Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), which struck down that state's system of financing public
education on the grounds that the substantially disparate tax bases between school districts
constituted a form of invidious discrimination. The carefully planned Florida system, which
makes every effort to ensure statewide uniformity, appears impervious to a challenge of this
nature. See generally San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Askew
v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
36. Municipalities would be similarly affected because of the manner in which they qual-
ify for state revenues sharing funds. Under Florida Statutes, § 218.23 (1977), a local govern-
ment must levy at least three mills or the equivalent to qualify for revenue sharing funds.
Thus, if the level of assessment is higher in one county than in other counties, greater local
effort will be required.
37. Brief for Appellee Owenby at 15.
38. When a parcel within a taxing unit is assessed at a higher level than other property,
the relief generally granted is to require that the assessment level of the other property be
increased. See, e.g., McNayr v. State ex. rel. DuPont Plaza Center, Inc., 166 So. 2d 142 (Fla.
1964). But if it is impossible or ineffective to raise the assessed value of other property, the
disputed assessment must be brought in line with the prevailing rate. See Sioux City Bridge
Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923); Deltona Corp. v. Bailey, 336 So. 2d 1163 (Fla.
1976); Dade County v. Salter, 194 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1966).
39. 345 So. 2d at 1060-61.
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in the concurring opinion of Justice Boyd."0
Had Justice Boyd's view prevailed, the various counties would
have been treated as if they were parcels of land within a single
county. By maintaining jurisdiction, the court could have required
all counties to attain equivalent assessment, thus ensuring that
appropriate efforts were made to achieve statewide uniformity at
this higher level."1 The majority opinion rejected the need for this
solution and the concomitant involvement of the judiciary in over-
seeing the complex operations of this state agency. Such judicial
prodding was unnecessary, as this task was already well under
way.4 2
Under the approach of the dissenting justices, the lower court's
finding of a denial of equal protection would have been upheld. The
tax roll of Gadsden County would have been reduced to "balance
the equities."'" While this remedy would have provided immediate
relief to Gadsden County taxpayers, it would also have disrupted
substantially the operation of the comprehensive administrative
framework designed to bring about eventual uniformity. Further-
more, the dissent's approach would provide an invitation to litigate
this issue every year."
The majority sensibly avoided the possibility of yearly litigation
by removing the very grounds upon which the equal protection chal-
lenge was based. It denied at the outset that the various counties
could be analogized to individual pieces of property within a specific
county. Instead, the court determined that counties were indepen-
dent entities for the purpose of ad valorem taxation and that neither
taxpayers nor local officials could look to assessment practices in
40. Id. at 1060.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1058 n.10.
43. It is clear that the court's reasoning was influenced by the fact that the Gadsden
County dispute arose during the initial phases of implementing the statutory effort toward
uniformity. Illustrative is the court's statement that "undoubtedly the zeal of the Depart-
ment in 1973 exacerbated these conditions. It is in the context of [its] new statutory duties
that the trial court below found Gadsden County taxpayers as a class had been denied equal
protection of the laws." Id. at 1058.
44. Id. at 1060-61. When the Florida Supreme Court rendered the Spooner decision in
1976, three years had intervened since the controversy arose. It would be unreasonable to
assume that the success of the 1973 statutory scheme went unnoticed by the court. In 1973
the average assessed valuation increase for all Florida counties was 24%. This rose to 33% in
1974. In 1975 and 1976 the increases began to level off, rising 12% and 5.5% each year
respectively.
In the case of Gadsden County, equality eventually prevailed. During a highly inflationary
period, the assessed valuation of Gadsden County property increased by only 1% in 1974, 5%
in 1975, and 3% in 1976. See FLA. DEP'T OF REvENuE, FLA. AD VALOREM VALUATIONS AND TAX
DATA (1976).
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other counties to evaluate their own level of assessment." This hold-
ing ratifies the administrative structure set up by the 1973 legisla-
ture to move ad valorem assessment levels toward statewide uni-
formity." In particular, it left to the Department of Revenue the
administrative duty and power to move individual counties toward
just valuation.
Addressing the equal protection issue, the court denied relief,
finding the evidence insufficient.47 But in so doing the court some-
what cryptically stated that "in any event [the data was] formu-
lated after the Department's and the Board's actions in this case."4
The implication is that in an equal protection challenge the crucial
evidence is not the levels of valuation in the various counties but
rather in the information upon which the Department of Revenue
based its enforcement efforts. In context, the court appeared to be
alluding to what perhaps should have been discussed specifically:
the extent of discretion available to the Department of Revenue in
carrying out its statutory oversight.
Florida courts traditionally afford great latitude to tax assessors
so long as there is a good-faith attempt to comply with the law.49
But under the general rubric of abuse of discretion, actions by ad-
ministrators in the tax collection process have been overturned. 0 In
Department of Revenue v. BeUl, 5' for example, owners of pasture and
grazing land within a multi-county flood control district alleged
that property used for the same purpose and having the same in-
come value was assessed much higher in one county than in another.
The Florida Supreme Court granted relief, holding that the depart-
ment had failed to perform its statutory duty to exercise general
supervision over assessments to assure that valuations of all prop-
erty were uniform .51
45. 345 So. 2d at 1059.
46. The significance of the approach of the majority is emphasized because it was not even
necessary to raise the issue of the various officials' powers. The majority indicated that the
regional evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to demonstrate a violation of equal
protection and that this evidentiary insufficiency alone was enough to resolve the case. 345
So. 2d at 1059.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., District School Bd. of Lee County v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973);
Exchange Realty Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 272 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1973); Powell v. Kelly,
223 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1969); Schleman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 9 So. 2d 197 (Fla.
1942); Keith Investments, Inc. v. James, 220 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
Harband, Inc. v. Anderson, 134 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
50. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Dade, 275 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973); Dade
County v. Salter, 194 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1966).
51. 227 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
52. Id. at 685; see FLA. STAT. § 195.022 (1977).
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This abuse of discretion analysis is implicit in the Spooner court's
reasoning, exemplified by its observation that statewide uniformity
of assessment valuation was more a goal than a compellable right
and by its comments about the practical difficulties in administer-
ing the property tax. 3 Had this test explicitly been applied in
Spooner, it seems clear that no abuse of discretion would have been
found. Faced with implementing legislation which attempts to unify
vastly disparate procedures, the court realized it was too much to
expect that the department would be instantly and completely suc-
cessful. It was sufficient that significant progress had been made in
reducing the previously existing differences. 4
Unresolved is the latitude the court might grant to the Depart-
ment of Revenue in future cases reviewing inter-county discrepan-
cies. Conceivably the Spooner court's toleration of rather substan-
tial disparities grants the Department of Revenue a level of discre-
tion which will be inappropriate in the future, when greater overall
uniformity will justify a more stringent standard.55 The recent deci-
sion in GAC Properties, Inc. v. Lanier" is illustrative. GAC owned
a large housing unit which consisted of 50,000 platted, undeveloped,
and virtually indistinguishable lots, of which approximately one
half were located in Polk County and the other half in Osceola
County. For 1975 ad valorem tax purposes, the lots in Polk County
were valued at $300 per lot and those in Osceola County were valued
at $560 per lot. Suit was brought by GAC alleging that the Depart-
ment of Revenue had failed to supervise the tax assessor of Osceola
County properly, as the true value of the property was shown by the
lower Polk County assessment. Although the trial court dismissed
this count, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reinstated it as
stating a cause of action.57
The result in GAC is significant in light of the Florida Supreme
Court's statement in Spooner that a taxpayer who is taxed at or
under 100% of fair market value has never had standing to complain
of an allegedly lower assessment level applied in another taxing
unit." By alleging that a disputed assessment exceeds 100% of the
53. 345 So. 2d at 1058, 1059-60.
54. Id. at 1058, 1060-61.
55. Justice Boyd's concurring opinion accepts as fact that Gadsden County was assessed
at 99% of full value, that the state average was near 82% of full value, and that many counties
with property assessed at values far below the 82% average had their tax rolls certified by
the Department of Revenue. Id. at 1060.
56. 345 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), petition for cert. filed, No. 51,714 (Fla.
May 23, 1977).
57. Id. at 813.
58. 345 So. 2d at 1059.
CASE COMMENTS
fair market value as shown by lower assessments in an adjoining
county, which GAC demonstrates in a singularly dramatic fashion,
a future litigant can draw in the Department of Revenue as a defen-
dant. This, in turn, will permit the litigant to present some of the
same kinds of evidentiary information refused under the equal pro-
tection challenge in Spooner in the context of an attack on the
supervisory oversight of the Department of Revenue. 5
The Spooner decision provides a judicial ratification of the De-
partment of Revenue's duty to supervise local constitutional officers
charged with ad valorem tax assessments. The court recognized that
.while this system will always be short of perfection, it nevertheless
provides a functional administrative framework through which
much of the existing disparity among counties can be eliminated.
Implied in the decision was that in carrying out this task the De-
partment of Revenue will be granted substantial judicial latitude.
The outer limits of this latitude will presumably be more specifi-
cally delineated by the disposition of the GA C dispute and similar
litigation.
CHARLES A. JOHNSON
59. The extent to which the Department of Revenue will be involved in these suits may
be limited by case law and by recent legislative changes. The case law provides that the
discretion granted to local assessors is such that a showing that two assessments are different
does not necessarily prove that one of them is invalid, especially if the two tax rolls were
prepared by different assessors. See, e.g., Keith Investments, Inc. v. James, 220 So. 2d 695
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The 1976 legislature attempted to increase the authority of
the local assessors in their relationship with the Department of Revenue. See ch. 76-234, 1976
Fla. Laws 534. The amendment provides that the standard measures of value promulgated
by the department shall be deemed "prima facie correct, but shall not be deemed to establish
the just value of any property." Id. § 9. This amendment substantially changed the prior
language of the statute, which had provided that these standard measures of value "shall be
deemed and held prima facie to be the standard measures of just valuation contemplated by
the constitution of this state in matters of taxation." Ch. 70-243, § 38, 1970 Fla. Laws 709.
1978]

